Idiots, liars and thieves have torched billions of dollars in this financial crisis. But it is a safe bet that at least as many billions were lost by smart people trying to do good, honest work on behalf of others -- usually as part of a committee.

Examples are so abundant it isn't hard to trip over them:

Compensation committees on Wall Street awarded multimillion-dollar bonuses to the very people who ended up nearly eviscerating the global financial system.

The investment committees at leading universities embraced hedge funds, private equity and real estate so unquestioningly that many ended up with 75% or more of their endowment in these illiquid assets.

Investment committees at charities fell as badly under Bernard Madoff's spell as lone investors did, often losing millions of dollars at a pop.

Boards of directors at mutual funds looked the other way as managers loaded up on toxic mortgage securities.

State boards of trustees approved risky investment menus for the '529' plans designed to help families save for their children's college costs. Not just dollars but dreams were destroyed.

So much for the wisdom of crowds. 'The best groups will be better than their best individual members,' says Robert Sutton, an organizational psychologist at Stanford University, 'and the worst groups will be worse than the worst individual.' That is because committees and other groups tend either to follow the leader in a rush of conformity or to polarize into warring camps.

For committees and other boards to work well, they must be made up of people with differing perspectives and experience who are unafraid to speak their minds, says Richard Larrick, a psychologist at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. They must also select and process information effectively and seek to learn systematically from their mistakes.

All too often, however, committees don't work well at all -- resulting in a relentlessly short-term outlook, an inability to stick to strategic plans, a slap-dash pursuit of the latest fad and a tendency to blame mistakes on somebody else. In short, for all their power and prestige, investment committees and boards of trustees are only human.

Fortunately, there are proven approaches that committees and other groups can use to improve their decisions. Some can even be adapted by individual investors, too. Here are a few ideas.

Measure what makes success. When selecting an outside money manager, a committee should decide, based on research and its own experience, which factors predict success. The most likely candidates: low expenses, tight risk controls, long investment horizons and managers with long tenure. Each of these factors can be measured with objective data.

Neuter the numbers. Gather data on these success factors for a short list of managers. Rank the managers on a numerical scale (say, 1 to 5) for each of the factors. Only after recording these scores from neutral evidence should anyone meet with a money manager in person. Investors should then rank, on the same scale, their overall impression of the manager from the meeting. Finally, take the average of all the scores on all the factors; the manager with the highest score gets the nod. This step alone would have prevented anyone from writing a big check to Bernard Madoff, since he rarely shared data with outsiders.

Reframe the question. Committees considering an important decision should break into a 'pro' and 'con' group, each developing the best arguments supporting its side. Individuals can do something similar by asking not only how much they will make if they are right but also how much they could lose if they turn out to be wrong. Try coming up with three reasons against an investment as well as three for it.

Use 'the five whys.' Rather than asking questions that have 'yes' or 'no' answers, ask 'how' and 'why' questions. Don't ask if someone deserves a bonus or whether an adviser is confident that an idea will generate superior returns. Ask, instead, why the bonus is deserved or why the idea is superior. Then ask why the person knows that answer is right. If you ask five such 'why' questions in a row, you are likely to expose any weak points in the advice.

Define the default position. Max Bazerman, an expert on decision-making at Harvard Business School, suggests that investors start with the assumption that the ideal portfolio is a diversified basket of low-cost index funds. Any deviation from that strategy should require extraordinarily compelling evidence.

If you look up 'oversight' in the dictionary, you will find the word can mean either scrutiny or omission. If committees, and the rest of us, developed the habit of employing the right kind of oversight, we would all be better off.

在當(dāng)前的金融危機(jī)中，白癡、騙子和小偷令數(shù)十億美元?dú)е�一炬。不過我敢保證，至少有與此相當(dāng)?shù)腻X在聰明人試圖為別人做好事實(shí)事的過程中損失掉了，這些人通常是某個(gè)委員會(huì)的一部分。

例子太多了，找到幾個(gè)并不難：

華爾街公司的薪酬委員會(huì)給那些幾乎摧毀了全球金融體系的人發(fā)放了數(shù)百萬美元的獎(jiǎng)金。

知名大學(xué)的投資委員會(huì)毫不懷疑地接受了對(duì)沖基金、私人資本運(yùn)營基金和房地產(chǎn)，很多都把75%甚至更多的捐贈(zèng)投入了這類流動(dòng)性不良的資產(chǎn)。

慈善機(jī)構(gòu)的投資委員會(huì)也和個(gè)人投資者一樣，在馬多夫(Bernard Madoff)的魔咒下摔的很慘，常常是頃刻之間損失了數(shù)百萬美元。

共同基金的董事會(huì)對(duì)基金經(jīng)理們大量買進(jìn)問題抵押貸款證券視而不見。

州理事會(huì)批準(zhǔn)了用旨在幫助家庭為孩子教育經(jīng)費(fèi)攢錢的“529計(jì)劃”進(jìn)行高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資。這樣以來，損失的不只是錢，夢(mèng)想也隨之破滅了。

群眾的智慧也不過如此。史坦福大學(xué)組織心理學(xué)家薩頓(Robert Sutton)說，最好的團(tuán)隊(duì)比其中最好的成員還要好，而最差的團(tuán)隊(duì)則比其中最差的成員還要差。這是因?yàn)槲瘑T會(huì)等組織往往要么就意見統(tǒng)一地跟著領(lǐng)導(dǎo)跑，要么就分化成兩個(gè)對(duì)抗的陣營。

杜克大學(xué)商學(xué)院的心理學(xué)家拉里克(Richard Larrick)說，要想讓委員會(huì)等組織發(fā)揮良好作用，它們必須由觀點(diǎn)和經(jīng)歷各異的人組成，這些人還要勇于發(fā)表自己的看法。他們還必須能夠有效地選擇和處理信息，并努力從錯(cuò)誤中吸取教訓(xùn)。

不過，委員會(huì)往往沒有發(fā)揮絲毫作用，導(dǎo)致持續(xù)的目光短淺、無法堅(jiān)持戰(zhàn)略性計(jì)劃、一味追逐潮流、并且有推脫責(zé)任的傾向。簡單講，盡管投資委員會(huì)和理事會(huì)有權(quán)有名，他們也只是凡人。

幸運(yùn)的是，委員會(huì)等組織可以利用一些已經(jīng)過實(shí)際檢驗(yàn)的手段來改進(jìn)決策。有些手段甚至個(gè)人投資者也可以使用。下面就是其中幾種方法：

對(duì)成功的因素進(jìn)行衡量。當(dāng)選擇一位外部投資經(jīng)理時(shí)，委員會(huì)應(yīng)該根據(jù)研究和經(jīng)驗(yàn)，確定哪些因素可以預(yù)示成功。最有可能的因素包括：低成本、嚴(yán)格的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制、長遠(yuǎn)的投資計(jì)劃、任期較長的經(jīng)理。這些因素中每一個(gè)都可以用客觀的數(shù)據(jù)加以衡量。

分析數(shù)據(jù)。收集幾位基金經(jīng)理在這些成功因素方面的數(shù)據(jù)。對(duì)于每個(gè)因素，將經(jīng)理們分級(jí)（比如按從1到5分級(jí)）。只有從客觀證據(jù)中紀(jì)錄這些分?jǐn)?shù)后，你才可以與投資經(jīng)理見面。投資者然后應(yīng)該按照同樣的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)給會(huì)面后的印象打分。最后，將全部因素的總分進(jìn)行平均，分?jǐn)?shù)最高的經(jīng)理就是你的人選。僅憑這個(gè)步驟就可以防止給馬多夫這樣的人開張巨額支票，原因是馬多夫很少與外部人士分享數(shù)據(jù)。

重新組織問題。委員會(huì)在考慮作出一項(xiàng)重大決策時(shí)，應(yīng)該被分為“支持”和“反對(duì)”兩派，每派提出支持己方觀點(diǎn)的最佳論據(jù)。個(gè)人投資者也可以采取類似的做法，不僅要問經(jīng)理在決策正確時(shí)能賺多少，還要問他們?cè)跊Q策失誤時(shí)可能會(huì)損失多少。爭取對(duì)每項(xiàng)投資想出3個(gè)支持的理由和3個(gè)反對(duì)的理由。

使用“5個(gè)為什么”。不要問那些答案是“是”或“不是”的問題，而是問“如何”和“為什么”這樣的問題。不要問某人是否理應(yīng)拿獎(jiǎng)金，或是一個(gè)顧問是否對(duì)一個(gè)想法將產(chǎn)生巨額回報(bào)有信心。而是問，某人為何應(yīng)該拿獎(jiǎng)金，或是為什么這個(gè)想法非常好。然后，問問為什么這個(gè)人知道那個(gè)答案是正確的。如果你連續(xù)問了5個(gè)這類“為什么”的問題，很可能會(huì)令建議中的任何弱點(diǎn)暴露出來。

定義默認(rèn)頭寸。哈佛大學(xué)商學(xué)院決策專家貝瑟曼(Max Bazerman)建議，投資者可以先假定理想的投資組合是分散化的一籃子低成本指數(shù)基金。任何背離這個(gè)戰(zhàn)略的投資都應(yīng)該有非常有說服力的證據(jù)。

如果你看看字典里“oversight”的定義，你就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)這個(gè)詞可以是監(jiān)督的意思也可以是失察的意思。假如委員會(huì)和我們其余的人養(yǎng)成了正確監(jiān)管的習(xí)慣，我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況都會(huì)好的多。