Roughly five years after internet users caught on, the bookshops are suddenly full of books about the user-generated content that “Web 2.0” makes possible: the blogs, Wikipedia, Facebook and the rest. Well, you can forget them, because easily the world's most profitable enabler of user-generated content opened the doors of its first superstore 50 years ago, in Almhult, Sweden.

    It is now hard to imagine life without Ikea. A folk statistic would have you believe that one in 10 Europeans is conceived in an Ikea bed. But isn't it pushing it a little to compare Ikea to Facebook?

    I'll admit that the similarities are not apparent at first sight. But a defining idea behind Wikipedia, Facebook and blogging platforms such as Wordpress is that if you give people the right tools, they'll use them to create wonderful things in collaboration with each other or with the organisation that provides the catalyst.

    Ikea's success is not so very different. Ikea keeps its costs and prices low by enlisting its customers – their time, their cars, their ambitions as interior designers, and their inflated ideas of their carpentry skills.

    The management experts Rafael Ramirez and Richard Normann pointed this out in the Harvard Business Review back in 1993. Ikea, they argued, was a success because it enabled “value co-production”. This infelicitous term partly refers to offering consumers a discount to build their own furniture. But it means much more: Ikea recruited its customers to the idea that they could not only put up shelves but they could design their own stylish living spaces, equipping them with tape measures and printing almost 200 million catalogues that also serve as design manuals. It also devoted huge energies to helping its suppliers and designers play their part, rather than passively buying what these people offered and then re-selling it.

    We all know that the formula works. But most successful formulas are easy to copy; this one is not, and that is the genius of it. In many ways Ikea seems to be offering yesterday's business model: surely we have less time than we did 20 years ago, while having more money to spend on our homes. When a typical London home costs £300,000, why are cheap sofas to put in it still such a tempting offering?

    Yet Ikea continues to thrive, proving how hard it is for competitors to muscle in on a business that has placed itself at the centre of a web of economic actors, all striving for the same goal: a funky sitting room for Steve and Alice from Croydon.

    Not many technology companies have succeeded in mobilising an army of “value co-producers” in the same way. Microsoft is the most important exception, creating a platform that supports – and is supported by – the efforts of countless other software companies. Games console manufacturers live or die with the companies that produce the games. And eBay is an old-school dotcom company that has created a near-unassailable position: the buyers go there because the sellers go there, and vice versa.

    Such a market position brings inevitable temptation to exploit it. Microsoft's tangles with the competition authorities are notorious. Facebook's new advertising system, “Beacon”, tells your friends about commercial sites you've visited; the project triggered a mini-rebellion among Facebook users. Ikea is an old hand at herding customers through a labyrinthine store layout. Customers don't like it but lacking a good enough alternative, we tolerate it.

    Or we tolerate it up to a point. My love affair with Facebook was brief and bland. And Ikea? Let's just say that my children were not conceived in an Ikea bed, and leave it at that.

    Tim Harford's new book, ‘The Logic of Life', is published on January 15 in the US and on February 1 in the UK 

    在網(wǎng)民著迷了大約5年之后，書店里突然之間充滿了各種有關(guān)用戶自創(chuàng)內(nèi)容的書籍。讓這一切變成可能的，是所謂的“Web 2.0”：博客、維基百科(Wikipedia)、Facebook，不一而足。不過，你大可忘了它們，因?yàn)槭澜缟献钯嶅X的用戶自創(chuàng)內(nèi)容“提供者”，早在50年前就在瑞典阿姆胡特開張了第一間超市。

    現(xiàn)在很難想象，如果沒有宜家(Ikea)，生活會(huì)是什么樣。民間統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)會(huì)讓你相信，每10個(gè)歐洲人，就有一個(gè)是在宜家的床上孕育出來的。看到這里，難道你不會(huì)從宜家聯(lián)想到Facebook？

    我承認(rèn)，乍看起來，兩者的共同點(diǎn)并不明顯。不過，維基百科、Facebook和Wordpress等博客平臺(tái)背后的定義性理念就是，如果你向人們提供了正確的工具，他們就會(huì)利用這些工具，通過彼此合作，或者與提供這種催化劑的組織合作，創(chuàng)造出非常出色的東西。

    宜家的成功也沒有太大差別。宜家能夠?qū)⒆约旱某杀竞蛢r(jià)格保持在較低水平，方法就是“征募”它的顧客——他們的時(shí)間、他們的汽車、他們成為室內(nèi)設(shè)計(jì)師的雄心，以及他們對(duì)自己木工手藝的膨脹信心。

    早在1993年，管理學(xué)專家拉斐爾•拉米雷斯(Rafael Ramirez)和理查德•諾曼(Richard Normann)就在《哈佛商業(yè)評(píng)論》(Harvard Business Review)上指出了這一點(diǎn)。他們提出，宜家的成功，是因?yàn)樗��?ldquo;價(jià)值共創(chuàng)”(value co-production)成為可能。這個(gè)不太恰當(dāng)?shù)脑~匯，部分意思是指向顧客提供折扣，由他們自己組裝家具。不過，它還有更多含義。宜家爭取到顧客對(duì)其觀點(diǎn)的認(rèn)同：他們不僅能自己組裝置物架，通過向他們提供卷尺、印刷近2億個(gè)同時(shí)可以作為設(shè)計(jì)手冊(cè)的商品目錄，顧客還能自己設(shè)計(jì)時(shí)髦的居住空間。宜家還投入巨大精力，幫助供應(yīng)商和設(shè)計(jì)師發(fā)揮自己的作用，而不是被動(dòng)購買他們提供的東西，然后轉(zhuǎn)手賣給顧客。

    我們都知道，這個(gè)模式很有效。多數(shù)成功的模式都易于抄襲，但這個(gè)模式屬于例外，而這就是其中的高明之處。從很多方面來看，宜家提供的似乎都是一個(gè)過時(shí)的商業(yè)模式：相比于20年前，我們的時(shí)間更緊張了，但有更多的錢可以花在房子上。當(dāng)一套普通的倫敦住宅就需要30萬英鎊的時(shí)候，一套廉價(jià)的沙發(fā)憑什么依然具有吸引力？

    然而，宜家依然生意興隆，證明了競爭者要向擠進(jìn)這塊業(yè)務(wù)是多么困難。這塊業(yè)務(wù)已經(jīng)成為一群經(jīng)濟(jì)行為人的中心，所有人都奮力追尋著同一個(gè)目標(biāo)：為來自克羅伊登的史迪夫(Steve)和愛麗絲(Alice)搭建一間有個(gè)性的起居室。

    沒有多少科技企業(yè)能夠用同樣的方法成功動(dòng)員一支“價(jià)值共創(chuàng)者”大軍。微軟(Microsoft)是最重要的例外，它創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)平臺(tái)，支持無數(shù)其它軟件公司的努力，同時(shí)也得到了它們的支持。游戲機(jī)生產(chǎn)商與游戲開發(fā)商存亡與共。eBay是一個(gè)老派的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司，建立了幾乎無人可以撼動(dòng)的地位：買家去eBay是因?yàn)橘u家在那里，賣家去eBay是因?yàn)橘I家在那里。

    有了這樣的市場地位，不可避免地會(huì)帶來利用這一地位的誘惑。微軟與反壟斷當(dāng)局的斗爭世人皆知。Facebook新的廣告系統(tǒng)“Beacon”會(huì)把你訪問過的商業(yè)網(wǎng)站告訴你的朋友；這個(gè)項(xiàng)目在用戶之中引發(fā)了小小的叛亂。宜家很擅長通過迷宮一樣的店鋪設(shè)計(jì)來引導(dǎo)顧客。顧客不喜歡，但沒有更好的選擇，只能忍著。

    也許，我們的容忍會(huì)有限度。我與Facebook的熱戀簡短而乏味。宜家呢？我只想說，我的孩子不是在宜家的床上孕育出來的。到此為止